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ABSTRACT

Information retrieval on graphs has applications in diverse areas, including analyzing
social networks, computer security, and understanding the evolution of drug resistance in
HIV. However, in each domain, there are relationships between data points that need to be
preserved to extract meaningful information. The data sets in each area could be represented
as data structures that could be embedded in graphs.
This dissertation seeks the approach of feature engineering for the information retrieval
from two very different but very large datasets, namely genome sequencing of HIV protease
to study the virus’ resistance to the HIV drugs and text data of illicit groups from telegram,
a social network platform. The goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the new, vital
information such as understanding the evolution of HIV protease or predicting if the given
message contains illicit information or not, doesn’t have to be based on high-cost computing
methods, and the resultant information is still comparable to its expensive alternatives.
To understand the evolution of HIV under the protease inhibitor drugs, this dissertation
first demonstrates feature-engineering of the HIV protease, a complex protein structure, as a
transitionally and rotationally invariant sparse vector representation preserving the relative
positions of Amino Acids. This dissertation then demonstrates the effectiveness of this vector
representation and understands the evolution of HIV protease as a minimal spanning tree.
In the end, by understanding the branches of minimal spanning trees covering these vector
representations of HIV protease through time, this dissertation concludes the important and
new observations on the resistance of HIV.
To seek the classification of a message being illicit or licit, this dissertation first under-

stands the nature of the illicit texts in the financial fraud domain in terms of the special
words used in known licit and illicit groups in different contexts and hence frequencies. This
dissertation feature-engineers the texts of these groups as sparse vectors by constructing a
new bag of words comprising these informative words. In the end, this dissertation demonstrates the effectiveness of these sparse vector representations by applying shallow classifiers
determining the ownership of the message given two groups.
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PART 1

INTRODUCTION

Information retrieval on graphs has applications in diverse areas including the analysis
of social networks, computer security, and understanding the evolution of drug resistance in
HIV. However, in each of these areas, there are relationships between data points that need
to be preserved in order to extract meaningful information. Hence data-sets in each area
could be represented as data structures that could be embedded in graphs.
Social networks are inherent part of billions of people today. Users are the primary
consumers of the social network platforms, where they can communicate through messages
with other users. With huge fraction of human population having social persona through a
variety of social networks, understanding human behavior in various aspects is equivalent to
analyzing social network data in different ways.
Social networks also allow the person to create a cyber persona that couldn’t be linked
to the user in the real world directly. A user could have several different cyber personas on
a single or multiple social networks. In addition, cyber social networks also provide world
wide platforms that are spanned through several national and international jurisdictions.
This means that social network platforms could also be used to organize criminal activities.
With an avalanche of information, its really hard to extract criminal information from the
social networks and identify criminal activities of a single person or create a criminal profile
of people in certain criminal domains.
The most popular social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and Whatsapp are heavily
protected against criminal activity as well as legal but harmful idiosyncrasies. Therefore
many people have turned to Telegram, a social network known for providing anonymity
to users and lack of scrutiny of the hosted contents. Hence understanding telegram graph
through various information retrieval tools means understanding the state of the art of

2

criminal domains.
Section 3 describes my work on telegram’s financial fraud domain. The introduction to
which is provided in 1.1.
Section 2 describes my work in using machine learning to understand evolution of drug
resistance in HIV, introduction to which is provided in 1.2
HIV, a highly mutative virus has exponential mutation rate because of is error prone
replication process. Due to this exponential mutation rate, the number of HIV virus mutations found is very high; several hundred mutants of the virus are found in a single patient.
This means that the drugs to treat this virus will have to target the replication steps that
are unique to the virus.
One of these virus specific mutation steps involves producing HIV protease, a protein
that the virus uses in the process of maturation after budding. Maturation is a critical step in
the viral life cycle and viruses that do not mature cannot infect cells. There is a class of HIV
curbing drugs that inhibits the protease and thus prevent the virus from becoming infective.
However, the several mutants of HIV virus in the infected person’s body respond to the HIV
drugs with different sensitivity. A drug resistance HIV will still mature and be infective even
when exposed to levels of the inhibitor that would effectively prevent maturation in wild
type virus. Through our research presented in this dissertation, we track the HIV protease
as a graph. The nodes of this graph are the representation of the protease and edges of this
graph represent the molecular similarity between the distinct protease. This design of the
graph is formed under the assumption that similar molecules have similar properties.

1.1

Feature Engineering and Machine learning on telegram’s financial fraud
echo-system
1.1.1 telegram as social network
Telegram is a cyber-social network that is based on the basis of ’freedom of speech’.

Telegram appeals to the users because of its fast end-to-end delivery, the type and vol-

3

ume of multimedia being communicated and stored without scrutiny. Telegram is also a
popular medium because of its no-censorship policy on its content, while protecting the
user’s anonymity with end-to-end encryption. Telegram also provides highly tunable privacy
options that no other platform provides, including secret chats, connection proxies, timed
auto-deletion of messages and no-trace-left exit from chat rooms.
1.1.2 entities in telegram
A telegram entity is a unit that is recognized distinctly as a special function/privilege
class in the telegram back-end. Telegram is comprised of three kinds of entities – messages,
entities which can read or post the messages, and messaging boards.
Messages are the entities that form the communication in telegram. A message could
hold text, multimedia, executable files, GIFs, emojis, etc but its wrapped into a general class
of message telegram, so on the higher level, hence would be identified as a ’message’, for the
purpose of this dissertation.
The entities that can read and write the messages are user accounts and bots. A user
account is defined by a unique phone number. A bot is a user with automation privileges,
and is recognized distinctly from the normal user in the telegram back-end. A bot is always
associated with a user account, but a user account can have several bots associated with it.
For the purpose of this dissertation, these kinds of entities would be referred as users unless
otherwise specified.
Messaging facilities could be sub categorized as groups, channels and chats. Groups
are the message boards where multiple users can read and write messages. Channels are
broadcast only bulletins where only the privileged users can post messages, but everyone
can read them. Chats are personalized interactions between two people. Each of these
messaging facilities is highly customizable, and telegram back-end identifies each of them
separately, so essentially there are several distinguishable sub-types of these, but for the
purpose of this dissertation, we only consider the public groups where everyone can post and
read the posted messages.
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1.1.3 telegram for illicit activities:Ease, Anonymity and no scrutiny
Telegram’s patronage is users from several countries – this is evident from the huge
amount of groups formed in different languages and vast participation from the patronage
of these groups. These users have formed groups and channels on all possible topics, most of
them consist of non-criminal content. However, due to telegram’s policy of not scrutinizing
the message content and protecting user’s identity by end-to-end encryption, telegram is also
the primary platform for several illicit activities.
The headquarters and the infrastructure of telegram are hosted around the world and are
kept secret to avoid the international criminal laws. Without the scrutiny from telegram,
these illicit activities also have a vast range; protests/ hate/ terrorist/ extremist groups,
illegal mutilation and sales of animals or animal parts, selling popular game/ movie/ travel
tickets at inflated prices, drugs/ weapon/ prescription sales, financial fraud etc [1]. For the
purpose of this dissertation, we only focus on illicit activities pertaining to financial fraud.
For purpose of this dissertation, we define the domain of illicit financial fraud as activities
pertaining to intent of illicit money transaction. Examples of these activities are including,
but not limited to money transfer between accounts/ countries for the sake of tax fraud
or hiding transactions from a government, stolen credit card information for unauthorized
use, bank check fraud, identity theft for the purpose of financial gain, free online accounts
and gift-cards bought from unauthorized use of money, tutorials on technicalities and social
engineering aspects of these activities. These illicit activities occurs as messages pertaining
to these activities posted in groups, channels, and one on one chats, where the users send or
receive these messages.
Setting an account on telegram is free, anonymous, requires zero investment or technical
skills. The only pre-requisite to conduct an illicit activity on telegram is to get a phone
number that is capable of receiving one text message for the sake of verification on telegram,
and once set, it could be proxied to the sole usage of primary telegram account. With the
revolution of telecommunication protocols such as VoIP, the phone number used to setup a
telegram account could be a virtual service that could be free on the web interface, without
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any strings attached to the user’s real identity.
1.1.4 Telegram as a backup to dark-web and scrutinized social media
The ease of having an anonymous telegram account also makes telegram an excellent backup for illicit activities on dark-web, as well as criminal activities on more popular
but heavily scrutinized online platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Whatsapp, Twitter,
Linkedin, Tiktok, Signal, Discord, and Snapchat.
1.1.5 Observing financial fraud ecosystem on telegram
In order to understand the financial fraud ecosystem within telegram, we have registered
as users with multiple phone numbers and joined several groups and channels pertaining to
financial fraud. In particular, we joined and monitored 100+ public groups for a year to
hypothesize the behaviors of the entities involved. Our role there is that of a spectator,
just observing the day-to-day business of financial fraud and not engaging in the telegram
ecosystem. Occasionally, we have also engaged in one on one interactions with some users
that have reached out to us posing as sellers. We have used these opportunities to verify the
knowledge we already had, and enhance it further, and hence strengthening our hypotheses
of the types of users and groups, their authority and influence.
The absence of peer reviewed qualitative or quantitative studies on the financial fraud
domain in telegram has left us to hypothesise our own empirical observations and test them.
Henceforth going forward, we are only able to explain what we have observed without being
able to cite similar peer reviewed observations. Our observations could be confirmed by
anyone having a telegram account and observing any random subset of groups of financial
fraud domain even by a quick glance.
We have empirically observed the following in the financial fraud ecosystem of telegram
over the period of last two years:
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1.1.6 Types of groups
Groups could be set to be either private or public. Private groups are the groups where
the membership is invite only, invitation being a link that has an expiration time. The
groups are created by users that serve as admins of the group. The public groups are the
groups that can be discovered by their name and anyone can join it.
Each financial fraud group has a life-cycle with the phases of the creation of the group,
the peek and the absence of the activity in that group. Once created, users can join the group.
Most users join a group directly by searching for the group handle in the search bar in the
telegram GUI and seek membership. In the financial fraud ecosystem, users also commonly
join a group indirectly when added to the group by another user. The users in this group
then start exchanging messages, where the messaging activity peaks eventually. The end of a
group’s life-cycle is reached abruptly or organically. Sometimes, the administrator’s decision
to shut down the group and move it to a different name, or abrupt abandonment ends the
group’s active participation abruptly. A group reaches to a slower and organic end when
active people leave the group for various reasons, and there is no activity for increasingly
long periods. for the purpose of this study, we consider the group inactive when it seizes to
be an active part of the financial fraud ecosystem either by removal or by non-activity, even
if the group still exists as a telegram entity.
we have observed that the private groups have a very short life-cycle and become
monotonous for the discussion content almost immediately after the formation. Also, the
channels are essentially used as bulletin boards, and the effective channels are usually run
by the influential administrators of public groups. Hence, for the purpose of this study, we
only chose to observe the public groups that have more than 50 users, and are active almost
every day for last two months on the day we mined the groups for their data.
1.1.7 Identifying active public groups
By observing this life-cycle of the financial fraud groups, we could deduce that the
groups that are public, have more than 50 users, and are active almost every day for last two
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months, could be considered active part of the financial fraud ecosystem. For the sake of
this study, we only focus on these groups that lead to quantitative studies for the sustainable
and substantial user to user interaction.
1.1.8 Types of users
From a user’s perspective, we have identified several roles of the participating users in
the financial fraud ecosystem. Just like any business, primarily, this ecosystem sustains on
buyers. Buyers are the users who pay money for buying illicit goods/ knowledge/ services.
Users who provide to these buyers are sellers. Not all sellers sell the promised or effective
products. The sellers who scam the buyers are often referred to as scammers. With the lack
of regulating laws, there are some third party users that work as middle-man, where they
guarantee the buyer that the desired goods will be delivered for the money. These users are
referred to as escrow. We have found that the reputed escrows are praised often, and buyers
vouch for them, but the validation or reason of their effectiveness is still under investigation
by us. There are also some users who advertise a particular buyer or group. Some users
also engage in one on one conversation with other potential buyers. Often times, these users
also add other users to groups pertaining to same or similar kind of fraud. These users
are referred as promoters. The motives of promoters vary depending on their role in the
business. Some promoters are administrators of certain groups, and are trying to popularize
it by praising or promoting it on other groups. We also classify the users who add other
users to a group as promoters. Most of these promoters gain some monetary benefits from
the promotion, but there are some users who promote certain groups or escrows just to gain
favor with the influential users or a promotion in their role. Sometimes the groups stipulate
posting privileges only if a user promotes the groups with either certain number message
forwards or by adding a certain number of users in the group. For the purpose of this study,
we have avoided these groups to be included in our data-set.
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1.1.9 Chatbots as users
Not all users in this ecosystem are human. Chat-bots, the users that are enabled with
programmable automation capacities, are also integral part of this ecosystem. Role of these
chat-bots varies depending on their programmed tasks. We have observed the chat-bots as
helpers to admins in a group, and hence in the capacity of promoters and admins. We have
observed chat-bots posting event based messages. For example, when a user joins a group
or posts messages with certain content, add or remove users, or walk a user through certain
steps to complete a process etc. The creator of a chat-bot is a user who can dynamically
change the functionality of a chat-bot. On occasions, we have also seen chat-bots chatting
with users, but this could be either a functionality of the underlying program or the creator
of chat-bot chatting through it.
1.1.10 Time-frame and entities across
As described in 1.1.5, the topology of the financial fraud ecosystem is highly dynamic.
In particular, the groups have life-cycle, the users and groups can change or delete their username or group-name without consequences, and the messages could be deleted on schedule
without leaving a trace.
Also, telegram as a platform removes all the digital footprints that could lead to real
identity of a person. In particular, telegram removes the timezone information by converting
the timestamp of a message to UTC time. Telegram also removes the metadata of any
files that are uploaded to the platform, hence anonymizing the location, name, or other
information that might lead to the real identity of the user.
Telegram identifies each user with a user id, that is uniquely associated with the phone
number that was used to create the user-account. User has option to hide their phone number
from public. Similarly, each group is also given a unique group-id at the time of its creation
that could not be changed.
The groups and users are searchable in the telegram GUI by their telegram handle, the
unique string that could uniquely identify a user as a username. For the purpose of this
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dissertation, we will use telegram handle and username interchangeably. Unlike user/group
id, the users or groups are not required to have a username, and this username could be
hidden, removed or changed any time.
Also, a user or a group is allowed to have a title. This title could hold the group’s
name or a user’s name. This title is the header that is seen by public when a group or user
is viewed. This title is different from the username of the group or group/user id and is
independently managed by a user or an admin. The title string doesn’t need to be unique
like username, and hence multiple users can have same names displayed and multiple groups
could have same titles. Also, this title could be changed frequently without leaving the trace
of the change.
For the purpose of this study, we only identify groups, messages and users by their
telegram ids. Going forward, the reference to distinct groups/messages/users means the
groups/users/messages having distinct ids.
The focus of this study is to understand and quantify typical behavior of financial fraud
domain. We did not wish to identify or quantify the anomalies quite yet. By observing about
100 financial fraud groups for a year, we determined that an observation window of about
60 consecutive days covers all the typical event patterns of the financial fraud ecosystem.
The users, groups and messages could be deleted without trace. However, absence of certain
messages or users would not contribute towards statistical variance of the common patterns.
1.1.11 Active efforts of identity obfuscation: Groups and Users
We have observed that users and groups actively try to misidentify or obfuscate their
identity, as in, some users try to match their username and profile picture to someone
influential, as well as a same user could deactivate his account and come back as a user
with new user-id as a ”new” user resuming his criminal activity. We do not know the
reasons behind this obfuscation, but our empirical observations suggest that misidentifying
themselves as an influential user attracts criminal buyers. Also, deactivating their account
severs ties to the dissatisfied buyers and bad reputation to the account, while its hard for

10

people to realize that the same user came back with a different account.
The same phenomenon occurs on the group level as well. Groups who have handles
and group profiles similar to that of the popular groups attract more subscribers. Also,
re-packaging an existing but dead group as a new group and adding the same members to it
allows the group to attract new and active criminal members while pretending to have been
popular already.
Due to these acts of obfuscation, its really hard to keep track of the same semantic
entity across the time.
Types of messages in a group The main media of the communication between
various users is messages. Messages are the short strings of text that the users post on
groups to communicate with each other. We have observed that in the criminal ecosystem
of telegram, the public groups contain mainly three kinds of messages: The advertisements
of the illegal goods posted by the sellers, the short messages that express interest in buying
the illegal goods, and the conversations between the users. These conversations could be one
sided messages such as welcome messages / removal messages from the automated chat-bots
or they could be two sided conversations between users.
1.1.12 Telegram study: our goals
The main goal of this study is to understand the relationship between the entities
involved in the financial fraud ecosystem. In particular, could we identify the ownership of
the message? As in, if we know enough of the examples of messages exchanged financial
fraud ecosystem, then given an unseen message,Could we classify if
1. the message is pertaining to financial fraud?
2. the message is a conversation or an advertisement of illicit activity?
3. the message is written by a chat-bot or not?
In particular, we seek to lay the ground work for answering questions like:
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• Can we take a fair sample of the financial fraud ecosystem, and study the entities
involved for their role in the ecosystem?
• Can we tell the difference between and the importance of the topics discussed in the
groups by comparing their texts to each other?
• for the entities related to illicit activities, can we quantify some of the qualities based
on the empirical evidence, and provide a generalization of the rule in the ecosystem?
• Can we profile the users, groups and messages?
by developing the machine learning, data analysis, and natural language tools required to
study social networks like Telegram. The answers towards these questions has been investigated in another MS dissertations by Sameera Tupuru and Fatemeh Aslanzadeh working
with me in this area.
1.1.13 Natural Language Approaches
The language in the telegram criminal network is English-like, but like vernacular English. The drawbacks of telegram language are that it doesn’t follow the word distribution
of the vernacular English, is jargon heavy, doesn’t always follow the grammar structure of
English, uses non-English words with English text. For the words that pass as English,
the context of these words is very different and hence the meaning of these English words
is different than that of vernacular English. Due to these limitations of the language, the
conventional NLP/NLU utilities do not come to our aid.
Given two groups/users, the goal of this research is to find the likely owner of the given
message. Our empirical observation pointed that there were some words that were used in
different context in the two given sets of messages. This implied that their frequencies were
different in both the sets – one was significantly higher than the other. We also looked at
the words that were used in highly different frequencies, and that too gave us a clue that a
message belonged to one set or the other.
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We converted this observation into a distinguishing feature by the following method:
We first found all the common words from the two given, labeled sets of words. We then
calculated relative Kullback measure of these word. For example, a word that appears in
both sets of groups has frequencies p1 and qi in both the sets. Then, the relative Kullback
measure of this word is pi log(pi /qi ) − qi log(qi /pi ). For all the common words in the given
two sets, this relative Kullback measure forms a two tailed distribution. The words at the
end of each tail are the idiomatic features that are so unique that determine the ownership
of a new message.
In the light of this words, a new message can now ignore all other words but these
words, and hence the text is a sparse representation of these informed bag of words. Using
this informed bag of words, now we can form all the massages as feature vectors with one
hot encoding and build models for the supervised learning.

1.2

Feature Engineering and Machine learning in HIV Protease Protein Structure
AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome) is a disease caused by highly mutative

virus, categorized as HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus). This virus uses HIV-protease
(PR) to build virus DNA with host cell proteins. PR blocking antiretroviral drugs are shown
to be effective therapy to the HIV infection. These drugs have different kinds of HIV-protease
inhibitors, preventing HIV-protease to be made in the cell. Eight of the most popular inhibitors are amprenavir (APV), indinavir (IDV), lopinavir (LPV), nelfinavir (NFV), ritonavir
(RTV), saquinavir (SQV), atazanavir (ATV), tipranavir (TPV) and darunavir (DRV).
HIV still mutates to resistant strains under these drugs making the drugs ineffective.
This could be prevented by predicting the drug resistance. In particular, the mechanism to
predict which HIV-protease inhibitors stop to be effective (are ’resistant’) to the production
of the HIV-protease could mark the underlying virus as a infectious mutant.
Biological structures, such as a proteins, are made of fixed set of molecules called Amino
Acids. These Amino Acids are situated at specific relative positions with each-other. To
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represent a protein mathematically, the absolute positions of the proteins is not important,
since they could exist anywhere in the living organism. For example, the same proteins exist
in each cell of human body, and their position in the cell is dynamic. Thus, To represent
a protein, the mathematical measure should be rotationally and translationally invariant.
The proteins are uniquely defined by their Amino Acids’ relative positions to each-other.
This set of uniquely relative positions fits the bill of being rotationally and translationally
invariant, and thus could be used as a vector representation of the protein.
Proteins are central part of viral infection, where virus uses special kinds of proteins
known as protease to dissolve the host cell walls to penetrate the cell. Drugs preventing
viral infection often inhibit the protease of this virus to be ineffective to stop the infection.
Being a protein, a protease could also be represented as a spatial structure. With this as
a feature vector, a protease could be tracked to see if the virus is resistant to the drug. A
popular method to identify these protease as a spatial vector is to study its crystal structure.
for example, the protease of T4 virus – T4-lysozime [2], [3] has been studies in details with
different vector represents of its crystal structure. This method of representation yields to
dense representations of proteins.
1.2.1 Protein representation through Voronoi Diagram
Given a set of points in a metric space, a Voronoi diagram gives a unique, tessellated
bounding boxes of these points. Thus, Voronoi diagram preserves the information of the
relative locations of the underlying points. Hence, when a set of points is presented as a
unit where only the relative positions of these points is important, they could be represented
uniquely by their Voronoi tessellation. Conversely, given a Voronoi tessellation, the underlying points could be unambiguously created in the same relative positions. Once created
for a specific protein, this unique Voronoi tessellation could be used to identify that specific
protein, irrespective of where it exists.
Giving a formal definition of Voronoi Diagram, let P = x1 , · · · xm be a set of points in
Rn , where m ≥ 2 and n ∈ N. V (P ), the Voronoi diagram/tessellation of P is defined as
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V (P ) = {V (x1 ), · · · V (xm )} where V (xi ) = {x ∈ Rn | k x − xi k≤k x − xj k ∀j, j 6= i}.
Small position change in a point only causes a few boundaries of this diagram to change,
the majority of the diagram remains unchanged.
A Voronoi diagram, as a data structure, is made of an arbitrary number of boundaries
that might be infinite. Thus, in terms of computer science, normalizing a Voronoi diagram
as a homogeneous data structure is NP hard.
1.2.2 Delaunay Triangulation:Dual of Voronoi Diagram
A graph is a set of nodes and edges. A dual graph of the given graph is obtained by
representing each face of this graph as a vertex and connecting each pair of faces through
an edge.
If each boundary of the Voronoi diagram is considered an edge, and the point where two
or more edges meet, is considered as a node, then the dual graph of this graph is a Delaunay
triangulation.
Given a set of points in a Euclidean space, each set of three distinct points has a unique
sphere passing through them. Through all possible combinations of three distinct points,
if the unique sphere passing through them contains any other point of the given set in it,
discard that triplet. Hence, at the end, only the triangles comprised of the three points
whose unique sphere passing through them does not contain any other point from that set.
This is the Delaunay triangulation of the given set. Each set of points in a Euclidean space
has a unique Delaunay triangulation.
Being a dual of a Voronoi diagram, Delaunay triangulation is also capable of representing a biological structure. Delaunay triangulation represents a biological structure as
sparse adjacency list of the nodes (molecules). In comparison to Voronoi node-edge representation of the bounding boxes, the Delaunay triangulation has less nodes and edges
by magnitudes. Also, Delaunay triangulation is a robust geometric structure, as in small
changes in the positions of the nodes do not change the Delaunay adjacency list. This is
hence a robust representation for the biological structures since the position of molecules
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in biological structures maintain a range of distances, but it doesn’t change the Delaunay
adjacency list.
1.2.3 Protein representation as Delaunay triangulation
A protein is a 3D chain of several Amino acids. Each Amino acid could be located
by the alpha-carbon at its center. Each protein could be represented as unique Delaunay
triangulation using their alpha-carbon positions. Once the triangulation is created, the
Delaunay adjacency list could be generated for all the Amino acids involved in that protein.
There are 20 types of Amino acids. Hence, each edge of a protein’s Delaunay triangulation
could be classified as an edge between Acid of type i and Acid of type j, where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 20.
Hence, a 20x20 edge metrics of all the possible types of Delaunay edges among the 20 types of
Amino Acids could be constructed. where the cell (i, j) represents the number of edges in the
Delaunay triangulation between the Amino Acids of type i and j. The Delaunay triangulation
being an underacted graph, this edge-count metric would be a symmetric matrix. The unique
information of this matrix lies in its upper triangle and diagonal - 210 cells out of the 400
cells.
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PART 2

EVOLUTION OF DRUG RESISTANCE IN HIV PROTEASE

Drug resistance is a critical problem limiting effective antiviral therapy for HIV/AIDS.
Computational techniques for predicting drug resistance profiles from genomic data can
accelerate the appropriate choice of therapy. These techniques can also be used to identify
protease mutants for experimental studies of resistance and thereby assist in the development
of next-generation therapies. Few studies, however, have assessed the evolution of resistance
from genotype-phenotype data.
The machine learning produced highly accurate and robust classification of resistance to
HIV protease inhibitors. Genotype data were mapped to the enzyme structure and encoded
using Delaunay triangulation. Estimates of evolutionary relationships, based on this encoding, and using Minimum Spanning Trees, showed clusters of mutations that closely resemble
the wild type. These clusters appear to evolve uniquely to more resistant phenotypes.
Using the triangulation metric and spanning trees results in paths that are consistent
with evolutionary theory.The majority of the paths show bifurcation, namely they switch
once from non-resistant to resistant or from resistant to non-resistant.Paths that lose resistance almost uniformly have far lower levels of resistance than those which either gain
resistance or are stable. This strongly suggests that selection for stability in the face of a
rapid rate of mutation is as important as selection for resistance in retroviral systems.
2.0.1 Background
Selection pressure due to the widespread use of anti-retroviral therapy [4] makes Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) a valuable model for studying evolution. HIV/AIDS is a
major pandemic disease[5] where more than 37 million people have been infected. Currently,
about 60 percent of the infected people receive anti-retroviral therapy. Antiviral drugs
block viral replication by targeting the viral enzymes, protease, reverse transcriptase and
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integrase, HIV entry and fusion to the host cell. Further progress in treating the disease is
hampered by the selection of drug-resistant viral strains. Since the conversion from the RNA
genome to DNA is error-prone, HIV mutates rapidly[6]. HIV readily forms quasi-species and
distinct viral strains. Thus, HIV possesses the prerequisite high degree of variation for the
rapid evolution of drug resistance. In addition to studying drug resistance to enhance the
development of novel therapeutics, studying the evolution of drug resistance can help define
the optimal strategy to overcome drug resistance with current approaches.
HIV protease is an excellent model system due to its relatively small size and the extensive data for sequence variants and structures [7]. The protease acts as a dimer of two
99-residue subunits. Experimental studies [8] and theoretical analysis [9] of the protease
mutants suggest that many of the secondary mutations contribute to the survival of the
original resistance mutations by improving the effectiveness of the protease for viral replication. These findings suggest that initial mutations introduce resistance and further selection
improves the fitness of the enzyme. Therefore, we expect to see linked sets of mutations in
the resistance data, and have developed an analysis based on Minimum Spanning Trees to
detect and analyze these linkages.
Previous studies by our group and others show that machine learning can accurately
predict resistance phenotype from genotype data for HIV protease and reverse transcriptase
[10],[11],[12],[13], [14],[15], [16], [17]. We have found that including structural data with the
sequence using Delaunay triangulation is an especially effective representation for machine
learning [18]. The combined sequence and structure information is compressed into a single
210-dimension vector for each mutant. In essence, this approach is an sequence edit distance
weighted by the most significant local contacts in the protein. It is nearly a linear metric
space [14]. Simple machine learning approaches such as a linear SVM and k-nearest neighbors
are able to reliably classify resistance data with this encoding of sequence and structure.
This approach is a marked contrast from other work where complicated or deep machine
learning approaches are used [19],[17],[16]. It creates the ability to use the features for more
than simple classification or regression. Our previous work [12],[11],[10],[14],[20],[18] has
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concentrated on developing models for predicting the resistance to single inhibitors. Shen et
al [14] and Pawar et al [20] demonstrated classification accuracies higher than 99%. However,
many of the resistant strains have lost susceptibility to all clinical inhibitors. It is important,
therefore, to apply machine learning to the prediction of resistance to multiple inhibitors.
Our previous work [20] showed that there was significant cross-prediction accuracy where
models trained on one inhibitor predict the response to other inhibitors. This suggests
that there are commonalities in resistance mechanisms and the first step to studying these
commonalities is to build a machine learning model that describes them. This model can
then be used to select sequences for expression, characterization, and structural analysis.
Gene trees are a major tool in the construction of molecular phylogeny [21], [22], [23],
[24] and they have been applied to HIV [25]. Much of the existing work has been applied
to estimate gene flow between species, gene duplication, and horizontal transfer. Typically,
sequence distances are used to estimate similarity between genes and then a graph is constructed that reflects the relationships between the genes. The graph is a tree in the absence
of horizontal transfer and gene duplication. There are subtle but important differences between the standard use of gene trees and this study because mutational data in the HIV
protease gene do not involve gene flow between species, gene duplication or horizontal transfer. This paper examines the onset of speciation or quasi-speciation under the selection
pressure of clinical treatment with potent protease inhibitors. It combines our highly effective representation of structure and sequence with well-understood algorithms for building
minimum spanning trees (MSTs) to estimate the evolutionary properties of HIV response to
drugs. Since this measure is linear or nearly linear and possesses metric properties, it should
be an effective proxy for evolutionary distance. MSTs will serve as a first approximation to
the gene tree.
The development of “super-resistance” is a related question. Naive selection theory
suggests the “first past the post” mutations, those that are sufficiently resistant to allow
HIV to reproduce in the presence of inhibitors, will be a majority of those selected. If drug
resistance alone is sufficient for evolutionary selection, why should new mutations accumulate
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in the protease? Yet there are many examples of highly resistant proteases bearing different
sets of multiple mutations which are believed to enhance viral replication [26]. The pattern
of resistance acquisition and loss along branches of the MSTs sheds light on the selective
pressures for drug resistance. The virus must not just become resistant, but must retain
resistance and effective replication in the presence of a high mutation rate.
2.0.2 Genotype-phenotype data from the Stanford HIVdb
The collated data in the Stanford database [27] is a valuable resource for computational
analyses. The data consist of the sequences of HIV drug targets, including HIV protease, and
resistance measures. The database is curated and updated regularly to reflect the current
status of drug resistance in HIV. We used the filtered phenosense data for this paper [28].

2.1

Results
2.1.1 Resistance Classification and Regression
The linear SVM was used to classify if the HIV protease sequence is resistant or not

based on the threshold of 3.0 as defined in the Stanford database (shown in Table 1). The
data are well-balanced for all inhibitors with the exception of Darunavir. Both the SWED
and RSWED were used to train two different models with 3-fold cross validation. The
quality of the prediction shows that our data were successfully updated. Table 2 2.2 shows
the classification accuracy for pairs of inhibitors. Note that while there is some correlation
between different inhibitors, there are significant differences between them. Table 2.3 shows
the results for triples of inhibitors. Only a subset (those with ATV) is shown to conserve
space, but the results are similar for all triples with both the RSWED and SWED metrics.
In addition to single inhibitors, classification of the resistance for all pairs and triples of
inhibitors was done. In all cases, a high classification accuracy (> 98%) was seen. Therefore,
it was important to examine regression, where the magnitude of the observed effect is predicted. This is a more difficult measure than binary classification. Regression was preformed
using random forest regression.
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Figure ?? shows the RMSE as a function of the training fraction for cross-validation.
A training fraction of 0.66 corresponds to 3-fold cross validation (2:1 ratio) and 0.2 is an
inverted 5-fold cross validation (1:4). Since the range of observed values for the data is
between 0 and 100, an RMSE < 0.1 corresponds to a high degree of accuracy. Figure 2.2
shows the distribution of RMSE for regressions over each pair and triple of inhibitors. The
correlation coefficients were in the high range from 98% to 99%.
2.1.2 Spanning Trees
Figure 2.4 represents the spanning trees of a random 10% split of data with ATV. The
nodes in these graphs represent the vectors generated by the upper triangular matrix with
average distance and count, respectively. These spanning trees are calculated with respect to
l2 distances when the nodes are represented by distance and count vectors, respectively. The
nodes that are resistant with value bigger than 3 for inhibitor are represented as green, and
the non-resistant nodes are represented as red. Empirically, the spanning trees for all splits
with respect to all the inhibitors have similar visualizations. The centers of these trees are
the nodes whose sequences differ at most in two places from the standard wild type HIV-1
protease sequence of the group B sub-type M. Consistent with the high mutational rate of
HIV, both resistant and susceptible strains develop differences from the standard sequence
in a similar manner.
2.1.3 Path statistics in the spanning trees
Since the paths or branches in figure 2.4 appear to show the selection for resistance
early in mutational history, followed by its conservation over time, it is necessary to examine
the behavior of resistance along the branches of the tree. The sequences at the roots of the
tree are close to the reference sequence and the branches, both resistant and non-resistant,
show increasing numbers of mutations as they move from away from the center.
The paths fall into five general categories, those that: remain below the resistance
threshold, gain resistance, lose resistance, remain above resistance threshold, or cross the
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threshold multiple times, creating a spiking pattern.
Due to the density of the data, we summarized the gain, loss and spike patterns by
plotting the mean value of resistance against the fraction of the path which is above the
resistance threshold. Figures 2.72.9,2.11 represent the scatter plots of paths that gain, lose
or spike in resistance. Each dot in these figures corresponds to an individual path. Figure
2.12 shows the histogram of the variance of paths above the resistance threshold. Most of
the paths that are resistant have low variance,s which indicates that the magnitude of the
resistance is stable, and therefore there is selection for stable resistance in the presence of
high mutational rates.

2.2

Discussion
This paper demonstrates three points. First, it shows that SWED and RSWED mea-

sures still work well for classification and regression of resistance. This result is important
since the sequence-structure representation was recalculated when the database was updated.
Second, it shows that these representations, when used to generate an MST, appear to be
valid proxies for evolutionary or mutational distances. Finally, the trajectory of resistance
along individual branches of the trees suggests that the selection pressures for resistance are
more complicated than would be naively thought.
2.2.1 Classification and Regression
With an elegant encoding, in this case the SWED and RSWED, even simple shallow
learning algorithms like the SVM can achieve high accuracy. The accuracy in this paper
is better than we achieved earlier, and we hypothesize that this is due to using better and
more complete data. Including features of the geometry (amino acid positions), along with
the labels (the sequence), results in an encoding for a physical object that captures most of
the essential information.
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2.2.2 A Proxy for Evolutionary Distance
Defining the evolutionary distance between two individual genomes is an open problem.
Obviously, the distance must reflect mutations, but in a highly mutable system like HIV,
straightforward counts of mutations can be misleading because the probability of a reverting
mutation is relatively high. Therefore, including structural or biochemical information to
assess the importance of individual mutations should improve accuracy. The SWED and
RSWED measures include structural information. Figure 2.4 shows a visualization of the
MST derived with both measures. The sequences at the roots of the tree are close to
the reference sequence, while the branches, both resistant and non-resistant, show increasing
numbers of mutations as they move away from the center. Interestingly, many of the branches
maintain resistance or non-resistance during evolution. Quite often an initial single or double
mutation becomes resistant and the resistance evolves further with additional mutations.
2.2.3 Behavior of the Branches
Analysis of the branches shows several interesting results. Most importantly, it shows
that selective pressure for resistance is complicated. Figures 2.7, 2.9 and 2.11 show the
relationship between path length and resistance for both paths that gain resistance and
those that lose it. The naive model of selection would expect that viruses would evolve to be
just resistant enough to replicate in the presence of inhibitors. Resistance along a branch or
path shows significant differences from this naive model. Paths that maintain resistance tend
to increase resistance to high levels. However, some paths may demonstrate ”spiking” where
they become highly resistant and then approach lower resistance levels. Paths that lose
resistance inevitably are never highly resistant. This result strongly suggests that there is
an additional selective pressure to become highly resistant. In the presence of high mutation
rates, molecules that are “just resistant enough” will readily lose resistance. Proteases that
are highly resistant could require many mutations to lose resistance.
It is clear in figures 2.7, 2.9 and 2.11 that there is some structure to the relationship
between resistance and path length. The structure could reflect paths that have the same
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root and diverge at some time during viral evolution. As a first pass at analyzing this
relation ship, we clustered paths using the dbscan [29] algorithm as implemented in python
scikit-learn [30] library. The similarity of paths starting from the same root is shown for a
representative sample in 2.5. That these points appear to lie on smooth curves suggests that
the structure seen in 2.7, 2.9 and 2.11 is due to paths that diverge during evolution.
2.3

Conclusion
A simple measure that combines structure and sequence is highly effective for classi-

fication and regression of drug resistance in HIV protease. Unlike pure sequence features,
shallow learning, even simple shallow learning algorithms like the linear SVM, produce accurate results with this representation. In addition to clustering and selecting sequences
for experimental study, the measure can be used for calculations the probe the evolutionary
relationship between isolates of HIV. Our results suggest two major points for evolution of
resistance. First, there is a conservation of resistance. Isolates become resistant early on
and then tend to stay resistant. Second, there is a selective pressure for isolates to become
highly resistant over time. Isolates that do not become highly resistant tend to lose resistance. This suggests that robustness with respect to mutation and change is an important
selection pressure in evolution.
2.4

Methods
The methods in this paper range from preparing the data (Data Expansion and Vector

Generation) to machine learning (Classification and Regression) and the development of
models of evolution. A new expansion of the data was needed as the Stanford database
was updated from the version used in previous work. This was a major update where
the curators cleaned up the data. Because new data were generated it was necessary to
show that our methods still worked. Classification and regression showed that the machine
learning approaches are still highly effective. MSTs and analysis of the branches or paths
in the trees was performed to inform hypotheses about selection due to drug pressure in
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Inhibitor fraction resistant fraction susceptible
FPV
36.4
63.6
ATV
21.5
78.5
IDV
33.8
66.2
LPV
34.5
65.5
NFV
27.3
72.7
SQV
68.3
31.7
TPV
60.4
39.6
DRV
97.1
2.9

accuracy F-score
99.5
99.5
99.7
99.8
99.6
99.7
99.6
99.6
99.6
99.7
99.6
99.6
99.7
99.8
99.92
99.93

Table 2.1: Classification statistics for HIVpr. Fraction of resistant vs non-resistant inhibitors
for all inhibitors. Other than for Darunavir, the datasets are well-balanced. The 3-fold crossvalidated accuracy and F-scores are shown for the count vectors using a linear SVM.

Inhibitor
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
FPV
FPV
FPV
FPV
FPV
FPV
FPV
IDV
IDV
IDV
IDV
IDV
LPV
LPV
LPV
LPV
NFV

Inhibitor Pearson R
DRV
0.6444
IDV
0.6139
LPV
0.3535
NFV
0.8655
SQV
0.9175
TPV
0.3837
ATV
0.617
DRV
0.8092
IDV
0.8215
LPV
0.8694
NFV
0.7385
SQV
0.4485
TPV
0.4229
DRV
0.4766
LPV
0.8671
NFV
0.8189
SQV
0.4657
TPV
0.4373
DRV
0.3024
NFV
0.6433
SQV
0.1664
TPV
0.3573
DRV
0.527

Accuracy
99.8577
99.7566
99.8217
99.808
99.796
99.808
99.8168
99.8715
99.8682
99.8907
99.8156
99.8219
99.894
99.6974
99.7512
99.6915
99.6959
99.8133
99.8013
99.7536
99.7166
99.8534
99.7646

Table 2.2: Classification statistics for pairs of inhibitors HIVpr using the SWED metric.
The Pearson R is between the resistance of the two inhibitors. The 3-fold cross-validated
accuracy is shown for random forest.
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Inhibitor
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV
ATV

Inhibitor Inhibitor Accuracy
DRV
FPV
99.8152
DRV
IDV
99.8365
DRV
LPV
99.8519
DRV
NFV
99.8358
DRV
SQV
99.8283
DRV
TPV
99.8183
FPV
IDV
99.7601
FPV
LPV
99.7686
FPV
NFV
99.7516
FPV
SQV
99.7658
FPV
TPV
99.7919
IDV
LPV
99.8149
IDV
NFV
99.8037
IDV
SQV
99.7727
IDV
TPV
99.842
LPV
NFV
99.7905
LPV
SQV
99.8075
LPV
TPV
99.8272
NFV
SQV
99.7558
NFV
TPV
99.8016
SQV
TPV
99.7983

Table 2.3: Classification statistics for a subset of the triples of inhibitors HIVpr using the
SWED metric. The 3-fold cross-validated accuracy is shown for random forest.

Figure 2.1: The dependence of RMSE on the fraction of data used to train a regression
analysis for one inhibitor based on the SWED encoding.
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Figure 2.2: The distribution of RMSE between calculated and observed resistance values in
2 and 3 inhibitor regression analyses. For two inhibitors the RMSE ranges from 0.04 to 0.1
and for three inhibitors from 0.1 to 0.22.

HIV. Our software is available from a Github repository [31]. The expanded dataset, even
when compressed, was too big for the repository and will be made available upon request to
qualified researchers.
Data Expansion The Stanford dataset[27] for HIV protease is comprised of different
protease sequences with the observed resistance in the Phenosense assay [28] for the 8 clinical
protease inhibitors FPV, ATV, IDV, LPV, NFV, SQV, TPV and DRV. The sequence of
the 99-amino acid protease monomer is presented, indicating those amino acids that are
different from the consensus sequence of HIV-1 Group M subtype B. Each position in the
sequence data may have more than one possible amino acid mutation. These mutations
are listed as multiple abbreviations along with insertion * and deletion # for the field of
that position. Sequences with two or more alternate amino acids at a single position were
expanded by constructing all possible sequences as described in [10],[11]. A total of 1951
genotype sequences were expanded to 414010 single sequences. The expansion potentially
could cause “cross talk” where one member of the expansion is in the test set and another
in the training set. We have shown previously that this has an insignificant effect[10],[11].
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Figure 2.3: The distance based sums(SWED) l2 norm spanning trees of ATV resistance.
Resistant and non-resistant nodes are represented by green and red colors respectively.
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Figure 2.4: The count based sums (RWSED) l2 norm spanning trees of ATV resistance.
Resistant and non-resistant nodes are represented by green and red colors respectively.
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Figure 2.5: Grouping paths with the same root together in a sample of SEWD shortest paths
for ATV. The y axis shows the number of paths in each cluster and the x axis shows the
fraction of those paths that are above the resistance threshold.
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Figure 2.6: SWED shortest paths that gain resistance for ATV. The y axis shows the mean
value for resistance along the path and the x axis shows the fraction of the path above the
threshold for resistance
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Figure 2.7: RSWED shortest paths that gain resistance for ATV. The y axis shows the mean
value for resistance along the path and the x axis shows the fraction of the path above the
threshold for resistance.
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Figure 2.8: SWED shortest paths that lose resistance for ATV. The y axis shows the mean
value for resistance along the path and the x axis shows the fraction of the path above the
threshold for resistance.
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Figure 2.9: RSWED shortest paths that lose resistance for ATV. The y axis shows the mean
value for resistance along the path and the x axis shows the fraction of the path above the
threshold for resistance.
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Figure 2.10: SWED shortest paths that fluctuate in resistance for ATV. The y axis shows
the mean value for resistance along the path and the x axis shows the fraction of the path
above the threshold for resistance.
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Figure 2.11: RSWED shortest paths that fluctuate in resistance for ATV. The y axis shows
the mean value for resistance along the path and the x axis shows the fraction of the path
above the threshold for resistance.
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Figure 2.12: SWED(left) and RSWED(right) histograms of the shortest paths that are above
resistance for ATV. 1.16% of SWED and 6.8% of RSWED paths have variance greater than
100.The histogram of paths forming the first bin are depicted in the top right corner of each
figure.
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2.4.1 Vector Generation
Vectors were generated for each sequence by obtaining the neighbors of each position of
this sequence from the Delaunay triangulation as was done in [12],[11],[10],[14],[20182018].
The coordinates of the αcarbon atoms were used, and all arcs of the triangulation were
used. Earlier studies in our lab [18],[10] showed these were sufficient. The long arcs in the
Delaunay triangulation, which correspond to distal surface contacts, are a small subset of
the total set of arcs. Other coarse representations of amino acids, such as center of mass, can
be highly variable with changes in the kind of amino acid. The first step in this process was
to use the positions of each amino acid residue from a crystal structure of the HIV protease
dimer with 198 residues (pdb entry 3oxc was used [32]). The Delaunay triangulation was
generated exactly once according to the position coordinates obtained from this file and
then we obtained the neighbors for each sequence based on this adjacency matrix. A 20x20
amino acid matrix was generated from this adjacency matrix in two different ways: average
distance and count between neighboring amino acids. Since this matrix is symmetric, we
take the upper triangular values of this matrix as a vector, which is of the size 1x210. The
count defines a Structure-Weighted Edit Distance (SWED) and the average distance defines
a Radial Structure-Weighted Edit Distance (RSWED).
2.4.2 Classification and Regression
The Stanford database curators recommend a resistance value of 3 in the phenosense
assay as the threshold for resistant/non-resistant proteases[27] and we used their recommendation. As a control, since we have recalculated the vectors with new data, the classification
calculations were repeated. The values for 3-fold cross validation are shown in Table 1 and
demonstrate that the data were generated successfully. The RMSE for regression for one
inhibitor as a function of the size of the training set is shown in Figure ??. This corresponds
to a correlation coefficient of > 99%.
In addition to control calculations for single inhibitors, the same calculations were performed for all pairs and triples of inhibitors. The average classification accuracy is > 99%
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and the distribution of RMSE is shown in Figure 2.2. Calculations were performed in python
using scikit-learn[30]. Regression was done with random-forest regression using two trees.
Classification used a linear SVM. Accuracy and F-Score are reported. The F-Score controls
for population effects.
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
TP
P recision =
TP + FP
TP
Recall =
TP + FN
P recision ∗ Recall
F − Score = 2
P recision + Recall
Accuracy =

where TP is true positive, TN true negative, FP false positive, and FN false negative
2.4.3 Spanning trees for evolution prediction
Minimum spanning trees were generated for both the SWED and RSWED vectors using
Python networkX [33] 2.2 and visualized with Gephi [34] 9.2. However, the amount of data
forced us to use a 10 % subset of the data due to limitations of the networkX library.
Therefore we repeated the calculation using 10 randomly selected 10 % samples from the
data to ensure that the results did not depend on the particular random sample. Nodes with
’NA’ resistance values (which were not observed or determined) were removed while making
the spanning tree for each inhibitor. Spanning trees were calculated for of each of these
splits. Computing spanning trees of the complete graph is computationally expensive and
time consuming, hence we used the spanning tree of each split with edges connecting 400
nearest neighbors for each node. Empirically we have observed that this method yields only
up to 2% different edges of resulting spanning trees, when calculated 400 nearest neighbors
vs complete graphs on these splits.
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2.4.4 Shortest paths from roots to leaves in the spanning trees
The roots of this spanning trees are the nodes representing sequences with low numbers of differences from the consensus ”wild type” sequence of HIV-1 Group M sub-type B
protease. The root nodes are same as or differ by at most two changes from the consensus sequence. We then calculate shortest paths from these nodes to all the leaves in the
spanning trees. The spanning trees created by Gephi [34] 9.2 where visualized with Forced
Atlas-2 [35] using a layout gravity of 35, node and edge size of 10. We have verified that the
visualizations look very similar for all other inhibitors.
2.4.5 Shortest paths classification
As noted in the results, the majority of the shortest paths in these spanning trees have
sequences with resistance levels that are not monotone from root to leaves. However, we are
interested in the behavior of sequences that gain resistance. Hence we classify the shortest
paths in four categories: paths that remain below, paths that remain above resistance level,
paths that gain resistance, and paths that lose resistance. We use the direction from root to
leaf as the progression for inhibitor resistance values.
2.4.6 Measurement of the resistance variance for resistant path segments
We are interested in the behavior of shortest path segments that are above resistance,
namely, how does the resistance level vary when the nodes in the path are resistant. In order
to understand this, we calculated the fraction of the path above resistance and the variance
of the resistance values for these path nodes.
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PART 3

ILLICIT ACTIVITY DETECTION IN LARGE-SCALE DARK AND
OPAQUE WEB SOCIAL NETWORKS

Many online chat applications live in a grey area between the legitimate web and the
dark net. The Telegram network in particular can aid criminal activities. Telegram hosts
“chats” which consist of varied conversations and advertisements. These chats take place
among automated “bots” and human users. Classifying legitimate activity from illegitimate
activity can aid law enforcement in finding criminals. Social network analysis of Telegram
chats presents a difficult problem. Users can change their username or create new accounts.
Users involved in criminal activity often do this to obscure their identity. This makes establishing the unique identity behind a given username challenging. Thus we explored classifying
users from their language usage in their chat messages.
The volume and velocity of Telegram chat data place it well within the domain of
big data. Machine learning and natural language processing (NLP) tools are necessary to
classify this chat data. We developed NLP tools for classifying users and the chat group to
which their messages belong. We found that legitimate and illegitimate chat groups could be
classified with high accuracy. We also were able to classify bots, humans, and advertisements
within conversations.

3.1

Introduction
Telegram is a social networking service comparable to but distinct from Twitter. Users

of Telegram are semi-anonymous. This anonymity can conceal criminal activities. Examples
include identity fraud, drug trade, bank fraud, and animal cruelty. Users also engage in
innocuous activity such as Python programming discussions. Unique identification of a
user enables attribution of message content to that user. This enables the discovery of
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relationships between different activities. User identification and relationship discovery are
important efforts in criminology and sociology. This paper applies statistical learning and
natural language processing techniques. These are used to create efficient tools for user
attribution.
Telegram is a social networking service comparable to but distinct from Twitter. Users
of Telegram are semi-anonymous. This anonymity can conceal criminal activities. Examples
include identity fraud, drug trade, bank fraud, and animal cruelty. Users also engage in
innocuous activity such as Python programming discussions. Unique identification of a
user enables attribution of message content to that user. This enables the discovery of
relationships between different activities. User identification and relationship discovery are
important efforts in criminology and sociology. This paper applies statistical learning and
natural language processing techniques. These are used to create efficient tools for user
attribution.
This paper aims to develop efficient approaches to identify high-information words in
a corpus of text. This allows the separation of one set of text from another with the aim
of attributing authorship and general purpose to the texts. The goal of this work is to
attribute authorship and group membership rather than to interpret the meaning of the
text. Therefore it is important to preserve the idiomatic nature of the texts.
The classic methodology for designing such an NLP classifier is to clean the data for
English, create a word dictionary, convert the sentences to one-hot vectors to use a word
and a sentence embedding strategy and vectorize text, and use a classifier to classify the
texts. Instead, we bypass the embedding by choosing the relatively high information words
and creating a feature dictionary with these. We then use binary classification directly on
the count hot vectors created by this dictionary. Moreover, the only data cleaning we use
here is to replace non-alphanumeric characters by blank spaces and remove stranded/single
characters (i.e. words of length 1). We do not remove any words besides these.
We list our contributions as following: implementing a novel word selection strategy
that makes for better features, and hence in turn simplifies the classification pipeline for two

42

text classes. Through this strategy, we can handle much larger volume of test data to be
classified by processing the heterogeneous text data in near real time.
3.1.1 Criminology
Previous work by criminologists has shown that dark net users choose encrypted platforms such as Telegram, Signal, and Jabber for communicating with each other [36]. Telegram is a Russian individual and group messaging service that was founded in 2013. The
servers hosting the Telegram service are based in the Middle East. As such it is difficult
or impossible for U.S. and Western prosecutors to acquire server-side chat records. While
the majority of users are engaged in entirely lawful activities a growing criminal element
has taken root. Many groups involved in illicit enterprises, which traditionally use the
dark web, have found it far more convenient to conduct business over Telegram and similar
“grey-web”[37] services. We use the term “opaque” to describe these activities, where users
deliberately obfuscate their identities to hide their activities.
Individual groups set up their own channels or chat rooms to deal in their area of
expertise. Other groups establish exchanges where services and products may be bartered,
for example “sim farms” to fake credentials [38]. User reputation is critical for establishing
connections and sales [39]. Therefore establishing computational tools that can track users
and their social networks is important [40]. There exists a great deal of overlap between
groups, with individual criminals active in multiple groups at any given time as well as the
more formal dark web markets.
Within these illicit networks there exists criminal jargon which is unique to the type
of crime being committed. Our work focuses on financial and white-collar crime. Thus we
frequently see terms like “fullz” (credit card information), or “dumps” (personally identifiable
information). These terms are directly related to the types of financial crime being committed
in any given group chat.
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3.1.2 Telegram Scraping Approaches
Telegram is accessible both through a traditional web browser interface and through
their mobile app. An Application Programming Interface (API) is available, however its use
is mostly restricted to Telegram-approved bots. The data were scraped by logging into each
group and downloading the HTML formatted history of the group chat. The HTML was
then parsed as described in section 3.4.3.
3.1.3 Telegram Language
The Telegram data differ from most text data sets in two important ways. First it
is highly idiomatic, where the idiomatic language varies from group to group. Second, the
messages tend to be short, which raises sampling issues where keywords are missed in a small
sample, when the messages are analyzed.
Individual groups employ their own slang, lingo, or cryptolect when they communicate
amongst themselves. This is both a measure of inclusion or group membership and a reflection of individual linguistic idiosyncrasies. Groups also can employ their own cryptolect,
words, and phrases unique to their criminal activities to intentionally cloak themselves from
inspection [41],[42]. “Thieves cant” and Cockney rhyming slang are classic examples of this
linguistic process. Traditional NLP approaches, like Word2Vec and Doc2Vec [43],[44], indicate that these terms would be the most feature rich. However many of these methods are
based on large, clean data sets of standard English, such as newspaper articles or literary
works which limits their applicability with non-standard English.
Telegram messages are typically short with respect to the total vocabulary used in a
group. The short message length gives rise to the issue of sample selection. In terms of
short sentences most NLP research has focused on sentiment analysis, often using Twitter
data [45],[46],[47]. Each message takes a sample of the total vocabulary. When a subset
of the words is used in machine learning as a set of features to identify a message source,
the messages may not have instances of each member of the feature set. These zeros are
relatively non-informative and lead to errors in the machine learning. In our ad detection
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we found that messages above a certain length, about 200 words, were all but guaranteed
to be ad spam. Since the fraction of words chosen is an arbitrary and adjustable parameter,
we chose to use 1%, 5%, 10%, 50% percentiles to select words. 50% corresponds to all the
words in the corpus. The accuracy, shown in Table 3.1, improves as a larger subset of the
words is used because the expected sampling follows Bernoulli statistics.

3.2

Existing text to vector transformation methods
3.2.1 Word2Vec
Word2Vec is a commonly used method for encoding text for machine learning [43]. In

most cases it works better than the earlier bag of words (BOW) approach [48]. However,
in the case of small idiomatic vocabularies, the differential in performance is not obvious.
Word2Vec can be described as a bag of sacks of words, where each sack contains words that
are related to each and describe some concept or idea. When the size of the vocabulary
is large, these sacks represent the redundancy in the language. For example, a sack might
contain “dog, hound, dogz, dogs, hounds, ..., retriever” which are clearly related. This
advantage disappears when the vocabulary is small. Word2Vec will converge to either a
small number of sacks, where each sack contains most of the vocabulary, or to a large
number of sacks where each sack only contains one or two words. In either case the additional
information stored in the features is minimal, but the training of Word2Vec could select the
most informative set of words.
Instead we decided to use a version of the BOW approach where information theory is
used to identify the interesting words. This is admittedly an approximation to the Word2Vec
solution with a small vocabulary, but nonetheless useful. Similar, albeit far more complicated
approaches, have been used when implementing bag of features (BOF) approaches to image
classification and recall [49]. The difference in complexity is due to the requirement of
defining regions in image problems, while in this work the regions are simply the words in
the text. The “informed bag of words” defines a set of features which references the content
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of the document and corresponds to the words that used the most differently between the
two sources. While we did not implement it for this work, the approach is readily extended
to phrases and word patterns.
3.2.2 Informed Bag of Words
The derivation of Informed Bag of Words (IBOW) starts from the word frequencies in
the data. Let p and q be frequencies or distributions and classes be the number of kinds
P
of objects. The Kullbeck-Leibler divergence classes plog( pq ) defines an information distance
between p and q. A sum like this is relatively useless for machine learning because it does
not identify individual words that can be used as features. Instead we select individual
objects, i, where pi log( pqii ) is large relative to other members of the set of objects. These
items will be both relatively high probability and more likely in p than in q. We refer to
these as interesting objects. Similarly qi log( pqii ) will be large when q is interesting. If we
select objects that are the extremes of the two-tailed divergence pi log( pqii ) − qi log( pqii ) then
we have a set of objects that maximizes the difference between p and q. As both qi and pi
must be non-zero in this equation, IBOW works on the intersection of the two data sets.

3.3

Related Work
The dark web and the social networks used for coordination of criminal activities spans

many platforms. Research into these networks combines many disciplines. To the best of
our knowledge, no research using the techniques we detail in this paper exists. Thus, we
provide a broad overview of the current literature that is most relevant to our work.
In [50], Ghosh et al. present a system called Automated Tool for Onion Labeling
(ATOL). This system crawls the Tor network to find hidden “onion” web sites to build a
corpus of keywords related to criminal activity. The system can then automatically classify
the hidden web sites using Term Frequency Inverse Corpus Frequency (TFICF) and a clustering technique similar to k-Means. The clusters are used for “thematic labeling” of the
content of web sites. The themes can be thought of as the overall topic of the web site for
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which search keywords can be used.
In [51], Tavabi et al. study a large corpus of messages posted to 80 deep and dark
web (d2web) forums over a period of more than a year. The study shows how the patterns
of discussion evolve and how many forums show similarities in content. Hidden Markov
Models (HMM) are used to find latent states between forums. The HMM model also allows
for modeling the volatility of the forum content. This is important since the content of the
forum may change over time. This could cause the forum to appear to no longer be criminal
in nature while still aiding criminal activity.
In [52], Bhalerao et al. propose a graph-based model to discover criminal supply chains.
The supply chains are discovered from the English-language “Hack” forums and Russianlanguage “Antichat” forums. The focus of the paper is commercial postings (similar to the
advertisement postings in this paper). An interaction graph of forum activity is built. The
graph is defined as G = (U, E), where each node u ∈ U is a user who posts on the forum,
and each edge (ua , ub ) ∈ E indicates that user ua sold a product to user ub . Forum words
are vectorized into their importance ranking using the term-frequency inverse documentfrequency (TF-IDF) algorithm. Several classifiers are used for the detection of supply chains.
Finally, in [53], a machine learning model is proposed to classify posts on the Instagram
social network related to illegal Internet drug dealing. The authors scrape three months of
data from the Instagram web site. A word frequency dictionary is built and used to vectorize
the data. Machine learning is applied using a decision tree, random forest, support vector
machine, and a LSTM-based deep learning model. Good performance is obtained with all
four models.

3.4

Methods
3.4.1 The Telegram Environment
Although there is no official listing of the most popular Telegram groups and bots, there

are several online tools that claim to find Telegram groups and channels [54],[55],[56],[57],
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[58], [59]. Telegram chat rooms come in two flavors: channels, primarily used for broadcasting
admin approved ads or listings, and groups, primarily used for social interactions or chats.
We focused on analyzing groups with no or minimal user restrictions on posting, and open
to the public, because they provide the stability of tracking them, and have a fair sample of
the actors involved in the topic.
These groups organically emerge primarily in two ways: either a virtually well connected
person forms them, and invites many of the contacts to join them, or a group of like-minded
people who got introduced to each other through common groups form their own group
where they have targeted discussions. The participating actors in these groups mostly do
not have physical social ties, their purpose of interactions is to either buy, sale or discuss
about goods that are considered illegal to trade in most of the countries. Hence, we found
that the types of the messages in these groups could be segregated into two main categories:
messages that are intended to either look for or sale specific goods/skill sets – “listings”,
and the rest of the messages – “non listings”. We found that the English used in both the
types differs significantly. Listings tended to be better phrased and richer in non-alphabetic
characters. The non-listings contained English words phrased in non-traditional ways and
were shorter in length. However, these Telegram messages differ from popular English used
in English speaking countries significantly. This may be because English is not the primary
language of most users.
3.4.2 Telegram group selection and network expansion
In order to test our methodology, we picked 100 groups discussing financial fraud ranging
from cryptocurrency scams, gift card scams, online service scams, stolen credit card information, and so on. These groups may also contain other types of fraud, but the common
intersections of these groups is discussion and information pertaining to financial fraud.
The primary way to search for public groups on Telegram is through its native search
feature where a key word search renders up-to 3 groups/users/channels if the keyword is a
part of the entity’s username string. Since our goal is to understand the groups related to
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the broad topic of online money scams, we started with getting 5 groups by searching the
keywords such as “fullz” , “dumps” and “CVV”. The criteria of picking and expanding on
these seed groups was to make sure that the groups had at-least 50 members, had at least
a page of recent English messages, had a public Telegram URL and any member was able
to post in the group, and the chat histories of which were accessible form the start of the
group.
The only way to advertise about Telegram groups is to post the group links in relevant
groups where people can join these groups. Hence, after picking the seeds, we searched for
unique recent links of other groups that were posted in these groups and successively kept
joining these groups until we hit a link that was not valid. We repeated this process with
breadth first search strategy.
Despite of automated tools such as Telegram APIs for a network crawl, we stuck to
manual crawling of new groups because we wanted a fair sample of the network, where we
refrained joining groups that were posted by a single person in the same group, and did
a quick sanity check for users that were recently online and were part of this group, and
that the group had indeed relevant messages pertaining to financial frauds. Since our goal
was to obtain representative groups across the number of members, balance of posts being
all listings to all non-listings, and most of the messages being posted by admins to most of
the messages being posted in coherent threads by various people, though we crawled 500+
groups in this process, we only included the ones that would pass these goodness criteria.
Upon joining the group, we manually downloaded the chat history of these groups.
3.4.3 Data Preparation
In Telegram messenger’s chat history, each user’s message is saved as an HTML tag
with a unique id. However, if a user posts consecutive messages within a few minutes and
without any other user posting a message in between, their second and later messages are
appended to their first message. We observed that in most cases, when the the text of
the first message is merged chronologically with the texts of its appended messages and
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considered as a single message block, it conveys a complete sentiment or message in contrast
to considering the texts of each of these messages as independent message blocks. Hence,
we define a unit message block to be the chronologically ordered texts of a message and its
appended messages.
In Telegram chatroom history exports, the users are identified by their non-unique username, and hence we cannot tell the difference between two users with the same username.
Hence, for the purpose of this study, we only consider the message block texts as reliable
features and ignore all other information from the HTML files. We parsed each group for
message block texts. Besides ASCII characters, these messages contain a large variety of
UTF-8 and UTF-16 characters, including emojis. However, we focus only on English characters. We cleaned the message text by converting to lower case, replacing non-alphabetic
characters by spaces and removing single letter words. For each group, we reserved 1/3rd
of messages for testing and hence splitting each groups into 2:1 train:test split by picking
message indices randomly, so that the chronological order of the messages becomes insignificant. We then build word counters of each group’s training data where we define a word
to be space separated set of alphabetic characters. We conclude our data preparation by
constructing word Python dictionaries (or hash-tables) which we use to build our models.
By comparing the sizes of train data sets we noticed a huge size imbalance in many
cases, and we observed skewed learning in training a binary classifier on training data sets
outside of 5 fold range of each-other, hence we only compare the groups whose train data
sets are within 5 folds of one another as a preventing measure for skewed learning.
We created/labeled five additional data sets to model questions where NLP techniques
are likely to be useful. These questions include distinguishing between bots and normal users,
isolating listings, telling legitimate from illicit groups, and distinguishing between different
social network agents.
bot data set :
Bots or chatbots are Telegram accounts that are capable of performing specific administrative
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tasks, such as printing a welcome message upon joining, printing the user’s name change
history, getting the Telegram userid, or noting the missing username, periodically posting a
message on behalf of admin, removing users if they post specific keywords etc. Many groups
in our data set use bots for a variety of tasks. In order to identify if the message was posted
by a bot, we extracted 2664 messages posted by 19 users among 13 groups that humans
identified as bots.
listings data set :
In order to test if our classifiers distinguish listings from messages, we created a listings data
set comprised of adverts for exchanging illegal goods and services. We did so by adding
58179 message blocks – a month’s data from a group classified by humans as ”listings only”
group.
legitimate data set :
In order to test if our classifiers could identify the illicit groups form legitimate groups, we
identified a group that discussed constructs of Python programming language and used its
2,2582 most recent message blocks as our legitimate data set.
conversation data set :
In order to test if our classifiers could differentiate between conversations and a mix of
conversations and listings, we identified a group with 2664 message blocks whose purpose
was to discuss how-tos for network attacks, and used it as conversation data set.
twitter data set :
We wanted to measure how the language of Telegram differs from that of the contemporary
popular English. In particular, can our models distinguish between current twitter English
and Telegram English? In order to test this, we picked English tweets for a random day in
past 1 year and randomized the tweets to create this data set.
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3.4.4 Language Model
In order to evaluate the language model, we defined a series of test systems. The first
and primary test was to see if the model could discriminate between one Telegram group and
another. Since we had identified and scraped 102 different groups, this gives 5253 unique
combinations of groups which is enough to derive meaningful statistics for the quality of the
model. We evaluated pairs of groups to maintain balanced or nearly balanced data sets. It
typically took about three hours of time to run five fold cross validation on all unique pairs
without GPU enhancement with a 1% percentile cutoff for the words and twelve hours with
50% (which used all the words).
The second test was to distinguish between regular human users and bots or automatic
users. We manually extracted bot messages and compared them to random selections of
human messages.
The third test was to compare advertisements or listings with conversational messages.
We assayed this both by comparing groups that were almost entirely listings with normal
groups and extracting an “ad” data set and comparing that with comparably sized random
selections of conversations.
Fourth, we compared a Python programming group, which is a sample of non-criminal
activity, with our “illicit” groups to show that we could discriminate between licit and illicit
activity, and finally, we compared Telegram messages to Twitter messages.
After creating word counters from the training data for each of the data sets, we compared all groups among the same data-length component of all the groups falling into 5
fold range of the size of their training data. for the cases of legitimate, bots, listings and
twitter data set, we compared as many lines of the smallest data set. Given two groups, the
goal here is to identify relatively high entropy words that make better features. In order
to achieve this goal, we paired all groups with other unique groups and compared all the
common words of the pair by calculating relative entropies. We then picked 1, 5, 10, 50% of
words on each end of the distribution generating three lists of high entropy words. We used
these words as the dictionary words for encoding each message block, thereby creating four
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Figure 3.1: A histogram of the relative entropy vs. count for the Python group and an
illicit group. The words shown are those that are significant at the 1% percentile cutoff.
The information metric has clearly identified the difference between the two groups. The
red vertical line shows the median.

different types of train-test vectors. For each pair of groups, we then trained the same classifier with the same hyper-parameters for each of these train vectors to compare how much
fluctuation in accuracy, precision, recall, sensitivity or specificity, F1 score, and Matthew’s
correlation coefficient was observed.
3.4.5 Encoding Features
Embedding techniques like Word2Vec [43], Doc2Vec [44], and Paragraph2Vec [60]
project the words in a document onto a set of vectors of similar words. Unfortunately,
the small size and idiomatic nature of the vocabulary in the Telegram messages tends to
obviate the advantage of this approach. The word vectors would be much shorter than the
100 or so typically used in Word2Vec to represent a single concept. Bots, for example, often
have a total vocabulary that is much smaller than 100 words, so reducing them to typical
Word2Vec sizes is impractical at best. Similarly, consistent misspellings and non-standard
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Figure 3.2: A histogram of the accuracy vs. count for classifiers of all distinct group pairs
built with 10% percentile of the words. As expected, it neatly follows a β distribution.

Figure 3.3: A histogram of the Matthew’s correlation vs. count for classifiers of all distinct
group pairs built with 10% of the words.
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usage is characteristic of some of the Telegram users. Consistent use of “ur” instead of
“your” is a useful feature for identifying a user or group, which the vector of words, alternate spellings, and synonyms in Word2Vec would hide.
In order to vectorize the message blocks, we first take the p=1, 5, or 10% words from
the word-entropy distribution. We use these words as dictionary, and construct ordered
word-count for this dictionary for each of the message blocks. Hence, each message block is
transformed to a 1 × |D| vector where |D| is the length of the dictionary. And if ith positions
of this vector is nonzero, say j, then this message block has ith word in the word dictionary
appear in it j many times. The sparse number of words in the word dictionary assures that
most of the message blocks would correspond to zero vectors, and hence the training matrix
would be sparse. Also, the smaller the p, the shorter the word-dictionary and the sparser
the training matrix.
3.4.6 Control Calculations
In order to measure the effectiveness of IBOW as a sentence embedding, we compare
IBOW with Doc2vec [60] sentence embedding and TF-IDF [61],[62],[63]. For Doc2Vec we
treated each message block as a document and provided a document id as the message block
number. We ran Doc2Vec with the gensim [64] library implementation with distributed
memory for 200 iterations, with linear decrease of learning rate from 0.03 to 0.01 and vector
size 52. We used sci-kit learn’s [65] TfidfVectorizer with l2 normalization and without a
threshold to build the TF-IDF model in this study. Thus in our study the TF-IDF model
used far more features than the IBOW model (see Figure 3.4).
3.4.7 Experimental Details
With word dictionaries for p = 1, 5, 10 and 50, we vectorized training message blocks
as ordered word counters for each pair of the groups. To study the goodness of this feature
selection method, we train three different binary classifiers for the same training vectors:
logistic regression and 1 layered artificial neural network (ann) capped by 200 iterations and
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adaboost with 100 solvers. For ann, we use 100 neurons with stochastic gradient decent
and constant learning rate 0.01. None of the hyper-parameters are tuned for any specific
group-pair, pr threshold values, rather, the hyper-parameters are chosen to be smallest but
generally optimal for many groups. We conducted the experiments with Python 3.7 on an
8core double-threaded i7 3.6GHz machine. We used numpy 1.18 [66],[67] with random seed
0 to process the data and scikit-learn 0.23 [65] with random seed 0 to build the models.
The Matthew’s correlation coefficient is a good alternative to F1 scores and ROC curves [68]
for representing training quality. The accuracy and Matthew’s Correlation coefficient are
defined:

Accuracy =

TP + TN
TP + FN + TN + FP

TP · TN − FP · FN
MC = p
(T P + F P )(T P + F N )(T N + F P )(T N + F N )
where TP is True Positive, TN is True Negative, FP is False Positive, and FN is False
Negative.

3.5

Results
Our results are comparable with state of the art algorithms on these data. Table 3.1

shows the mean and standard deviations as a function of algorithm and percentile. Figure
3.1 shows an example of the distribution of words for Python vs an illicit group with respect
to the relative entropy measure. Most of the words near the median are not informative,
and even the 1% percentile shows meaningful differences in the features. It is clear from
the words shown in Figure 3.1 that the Python group is mostly concerned with helping
solve programming errors and the other group about credit cards. Figure 3.2 shows the
distribution of the accuracy and Figure 3.3 the Matthew’s correlation coefficient when all
groups are trained against all other groups in the data with a 10% percentile with an ANN.
The TP rate vs FP rate is shown for a typical criminal group in figure 3.7. This figure shows
the effect of percentile of data used on the reliability of the machine learning model. In order
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to summarize the results, the histograms show the counts over all 5253 unique pairs. The
distributions follow a β distribution, which expected for random errors when the minimum
and maximum values are constrained to a range. Generally speaking there is not a large
difference between using the 10% percentile and the 50% percentile. Using more data in the
model, not unsurprisingly, improves the results, but most of the improvement is seen early
on.
The Figures 3.6, 3.9, and 3.11 show our the accuracy of our results on different kinds
of data. The corresponding Figures 3.8, 3.10, and 3.12 show the corresponding Matthew’s
correlation coefficient. Five-fold cross validation was run on many individual runs and the
figures show a histogram of the relevant statistic. Since the choice of percentile cutoff is
arbitrary each row in the figures shows a different value of the percentile. As expected, the
distributions have less spread and move towards the right as the fraction of data used is
increased.
3.5.1 Comparison with TF-IDF and Doc2Vec
TF-IDF is based on a probabilistic model of word occurrence in text [63],[62]. There
have been efforts to place it on an information theoretical basis [61] and the information
theoretical basis resembles the IBOW approach. The major difference between IBOW and
TF-IDF is that TF-IDF uses the Kullback-Leibler divergence for the probability of the
document given the word, while IBOW uses a two-tailed Kullback-Leibler divergence for the
relative probability of the word in two sets of documents. In its classic formulation TF-IDF
identifies weights based on word frequencies corrected for the frequency of the word in a
set of documents. These weights are then used as a linear discriminator for classification.
As such TF-IDF uses the union of the words in the total corpus as a feature set unless a
threshold is set. The threshold corresponds to IBOW’s choice of percentile.
Comparison of the accuracy of IBOW with TF-IDF and Doc2Vec is shown in Figure
3.5. Both TF-IDF and IBOW are significantly better than Doc2Vec, and TF-IDF, as run,
is slightly better than our approach. That TF-IDF is better is not surprising as TF-IDF
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Figure 3.4: A histogram of the number of TF-IDF words divided by the number of words in
our approach. The data for the 10% percentile in IBOW is shown.

uses far more features than IBOW as shown in Figure 3.4. IBOW generates nearly the same
accuracy as TF-IDF with at least ten times less features which shows that its linguistic
model effectively captures the essential feature of the conversation. Using so many more
features to receive a few percent better accuracy violates the economy of features which is
important for performance with big data. Doc2Vec, in addition to being less accurate than
either TF-IDF or IBOW, is significantly slower and averages 20 or more CPU minutes per
trial where the other approaches use less than a minute. These data are summarized over
a large (1689 samples) and representative subset of the one group vs another test set. The
CPU requirements for Doc2Vec limited the size of the test. The machine learning was done
with Logistic Regression to eliminate the effects due to differences tuning meta-parameters
in Adaboost and ANN.
3.5.2 Bot Detection
Bot messages vary between highly repetitive messages, such as “Welcome to the group”
and more complex messages where the group administrator uses the bot to post an announcement. However, even in the more complex messages, the language is highly formatted and
relatively rigid with respect to human-based chats. The distributions shown in Figures 3.6
and 3.8 demonstrate that reasonable accuracies can be found even with fairly small numbers
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Figure 3.5: A histogram of relative accuracy of our method (10% percentile). The upper
panel shows IBOW-Doc2Vec and the lower panel shows IBOW-TF-IDF. Positive numbers
are where IBOW is better.
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of words (1% percentile). The Matthew’s coefficient shows that using more words improves
the balance between FN and FP predictions.

Figure 3.6: A histogram of the cross-validated accuracy of the deciding whether a message
came from a bot or a human. Each row shows the dependence on the percentile of the data
used.

3.5.3 Listing Detection
Listings or ads are less repetitive than bot messages. Since they are written by members
of the community they more difficult to distinguish from chats because the linguistic features
of a listing and a chat written by the same person will be highly similar. Figure 3.9 shows
the distribution of accuracy and it is not as good as the bot example (Figure 3.6). The
Matthew’s correlation, Figure 3.10, shows a wider spread than that seen with bots as well.
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Figure 3.7: A scatter plot of a typical criminal group with respect to other criminal groups.
The data of 1, 5, 10 and 50 percentile with false positive messages as x axis and true positive
messages as y axis, obtained by artificial neural network. The figure shows that the reliability
of the model increases as the percentile of data is increased.

3.5.4 Group Comparisons
The overall comparison of groups, all 5253 pairs, is shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. More
interesting, from a sociological perspective is the accuracy at determining whether a group
was one centered on bank fraud or other illicit activity or one centered on a normal activity.
Since many of the Telegram groups have misleading names, for example one on “puppies” being images of dog-fighting, we chose a Python programming group as a control set. We could
quickly verify that the Python group was on programming and not snakes. Another similar
control was to establish if a message came from Telegram or the similar social networking
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Figure 3.8: A histogram of the Matthew’s correlation coefficient of the deciding whether a
message came from a bot or a human. Each row shows the dependence on the percentile of
the data used.

site, Twitter.
Python vs. Illicit :
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of words for Python vs a similar sized bank fraud chat
group. Interestingly, even at 1% percentile, the words show a human-comprehensible difference. This demonstrates that IBOW can be used to develop human comprehensible machine
learning models. The Python group, in addition to the word “Python”, includes Python language terms (e.g. “self”, “list”) and words that describe the kinds of conversations (“help”,
“code”, “error”). The words in the Python group are clearly literate and avoid slang. The
bank fraud group has distinctive slang (“bro”, “lol”, “ur”), and content (“card”, “address”,
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Figure 3.9: A histogram of the cross-validated accuracy of the deciding whether a message
was a listing or a conversation. Each row shows the dependence on the percentile of the data
used.

“mac”). The two groups also differ in their use of “low information” words like “and”,
“you”, “in”, and “ok”. Figure 3.11 shows the distribution of the accuracy and Figure 3.12
distribution of the Matthew’s coefficient for Python vs illicit chats. Again, increasing the
number of words has a larger effect on the Matthew’s coefficient than the accuracy.
Twitter vs Telegram :
Figure 3.13 shows the distribution of accuracy when Twitter data were compared to Telegram
data. The quality of classification was much higher than with Telegram vs Telegram, so we
only present the 10% percentile here. All tweets from a random day, September 23 2019,
were downloaded from twitter dumps. Tweets were selected that were in English, more than
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Figure 3.10: A histogram of the Matthew’s correlation coefficient of the deciding whether a
message was a listing or a conversation. Each row shows the dependence on the percentile
of the data used.

two million, and processed in the same manner as the Telegram data. Random balanced
subsets of the processed Twitter data were used to ensure that the machine learning reflected
the accuracy of the model rather were due to imbalanced data.

3.6

Conclusions
3.6.1 Summary
Our work shows that a relatively simple and economical algorithm, based on a two-tailed

Kullback-Leibler divergence, determines a set of features that accurately classify short idiomatic messages. The algorithm is economical both in memory use and computer processing
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Figure 3.11: A histogram of the cross-validated accuracy of the deciding whether a message
came from a Python group or an illicit one. Each row shows the dependence on the percentile
of the data used.

Accuracy
Matthew’s coefficient
logreg
AdaBoost
ANN
logreg
AdaBoost
ANN
mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev
p = 1 79.84 8.11 80.07 7.67 82.36 8.01
0.49
0.19
0.5
0.18
0.56
0.19
p = 5 84.46 7.09 83.94 7.02 86.84 6.75
0.62
0.16
0.61
0.16
0.68
0.15
p = 10 86.1
6.71 84.93 6.82 87.95 6.23
0.66
0.15
0.63
0.15
0.71
0.14
p = 50 87.94 6.22 87.94 6.22 89.15 5.84
0.7
0.14
0.65
0.15
0.74
0.13
Table 3.1: The accuracy (in percentage) and Matthew’s correlation coefficient for Logistic
Regression, Adaboost and ANN, and percentiles of the data. The ANN is the best algorithm,
but the difference is not large and within the observed variance. The difference between 10%
and 50% is small compared to the increase in the work required.
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Figure 3.12: A histogram of the Matthew’s correlation coefficient of the deciding whether
a message came from a Python group or an illicit one. Each row shows the dependence on
the percentile of the data used.
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Figure 3.13: A histogram of the cross-validated accuracy of the deciding whether a message
came from a Telegram group or Twitter. The 10% percentile was used for this figure.

time, which makes it eminently suitable for big data problems.
We successfully classified the originating group of 5,253 pairs of Telegram chats, distinguished bot messages from human ones, identified listings or advertisements, and identified
human comprehensible differences between illicit conversations and Python programming
conversations. Our approach also could identify the difference between social networking
entities, distinguishing Twitter from Telegram. The approach is considerably more accurate
than embedding algorithms like Doc2Vec on this kind of data. It is also much faster than
Doc2Vec. It is a little less accurate than TF-IDF, but uses far fewer features.
3.6.2 Future Work
Future work includes extending the algorithm to handle phrases and sets of words. This
should improve the accuracy while keeping the efficiency. However, it may require an extra
unsupervised machine learning step to extract the most meaningful phrases much as is used
in embedding algorithms. Combinations of this approach with embedding, at least at the
word level, could be useful for larger and longer documents. We could also explore the use

67

of an “inverse document frequency”, the IDF in TF-IDF, to improve accuracy. Finally, the
work should be extended to include non-literary features, such as emojis and non-ASCII
UTF-8 and UTF-16 characters.
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PART 4

CONCLUSION

As a conclusion, this dissertation follows process towards graph-information retrieval
using feature engineering:
4.0.1 Defining the base problem as a binary classification
Given datasets, we first posed the questions in terms of binary classifications. In the
case of HIV protease, we posed the question of binary classification: Given an HIV protease,
could we tell if it is resistant or not? Given a resistant HIV protease, couuld we tell if the
resistance level is high or low? In case of the telegram messages, we posed the question of
binary classification: given a message, and two types of authors, could we tell which one is
the most likely author of the message?
4.0.2 Understanding the information that holds value with the questions asked
Given the dataset and posed the questions, understanding the information that holds
importance with respect to relations. In the case of HIV protease mutations dataset, the
need of its representation being translational and rotational invariant and preservation of the
relative amino acid structure arose from the data being a protein. The need of data being
a metric that represents the evolution of the protein arose from that fact that the questions
being asked were across the mutations representing different time, making the underlying
graph a metric representation of entities across the time. In the case of telegram groups
messages dataset, the training examples for messages pertaining to each type of author were
already given. The need of finding the words that represented their special usage in the
contrast of two given sets arose from the question that was being asked: determining the
author of the message.
As illustrated in both the datasets, the understanding of the important information
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is very domain specific. There are several ways to obtain this understanding, including
representing the purpose of the underlying objects that are to be represented as vectors as
in HIV protease dataset, or empirically observing the word usage that was special in the
telegram dataset.
4.0.3 Mathematically translating this important information to sparse feature vectors
Once understood, the important information was translated into a mathematical representation. In the case of HIV protease, the Delaunay Triangulation, a model that satisfied
the needs of translational and rotational invariance and preservation of the relative molecule
structure was used to represent the HIV protease. In the case of telegram message, the words
serving as idiomatic features were noticed to be captured by relative Kullback measure, and
the messages were represented as sparse vectors with respect to the bag of these informed
words.
Finding the existing models such as Delaunay Triangulation and relative Kullback measure that befitted the information that was crucial to answering the questions required the
concrete understanding on what was needed from the information and was highly domain
specific.
4.0.4 Graph construction on the nodes that are represented by the sparse feature
vectors
The edges of the graph came from the underlying data,as structural similarity. In the
HIV protease case, the nodes represented the HIV protease, and the edges represented the
similarity between the HIV protease’s vector representation. In the case of telegram data, the
edges represented the messages, and the edges represented the structural similarity between
message representations constructed with the same informed bag of words.
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4.0.5 Validation of this new feature vectors as representation of the entities that they
were supposed to represent
Once constructed, these feature vectors that were supposed to represent the HIV protease and telegram messages were tested with three fold cross validation to answer the binary
classification questions posed at the beginning. We did so by using shallow classifiers such as
SVM or ANN. The underlying assumption was that the vector similarity between two objects
meant that these objects belonged to the same class. We could use these shallow classifiers
because the vector representations were sparse, and captured the essential relations in the
information that was required to make a high accuracy classification.
4.0.6 Finding the new information using the similarity through the sparse representation
Since the sparse representation of the underlying objects was found to be robust as it
answered the classification questions with high accuracy, we could now use the same similarity
to obtain new information using the existing graph information retrieval techniques. In the
case of HIV protease, sketching the minimal spanning tree of these HIV protease told us the
story of the evolution, since the similarity between the two HIV proease could be interpreted
across the time. In the case of telegram messages, the similarity between two messages
yielded a natural clustering of its authors and illustrated the characteristics of these authors
in terms of their language usage patterns. Since the similarity between messages could be
interpreted in terms of the kind of English used, the vectors of illicit messages also let us
build a prototype of the ”English” used by the criminals.
4.0.7 Lowering computational cost and still having comparable goodness metric
One of the main purposes of this dissertation is to device feature engineering to reduce
computational cost without suffering an incomparable reduction in the accuracy, precision,
recall, f1 score or Matthew’s correlation coefficient. The results show that the sparse features
obtained by the methods in this dissertation result in lowering the time and computational
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complexity enough that the shallow classifiers such as SVM and ANN resulted in stellar
goodness metric scores. The results generated by this dissertation did not have to be trained
on special hardware such as CPUs or GPUs and used computationally expensive models such
as deep neural networks, but could still answer the questions with high efficiency. The same
questions could have not been answered without these special accommodations without the
understanding of the domain knowledge and choosing the right mathematical models. The
route without feature engineering when taken could be studied in [69] [70] where the results
obtained heavily depend on the complex systems that reduce the apriori domain knowledge.
For the rest of the chapter, we list the conclusions of each of the studies separately.

4.1

Concluding the study of HIV protease and drug resistance
The section 2 shows the results in the two main aspects: The goodness of the feature-

engineered sparse vector representations SWED and RSWED, and the new information gain
by using SWED and RSWED similarities to track HIV protease across the time.
In particular, The sparse vector representation of HIV protease captures is very effective
proxying the HIV protease genome sequence for tracking the evolution of HIV protease under
the influence of most popular HIV protease inhibiting drugs. This is evident by the average
accuracy of 99.5% of the binary classification of the drug resistance. This research also
demonstrated that the same feature representation could be used for the regression purposes
to know the drug resistance as a continuous number.
The SWED and RSWED vectors are generated simply by counting the neighbors of each
Amino Acid of HIV protease in its Delaunay triangulation. This Delaunay triangulation is
calculated just once on the base sequence of HIV protease and used multiple times for each
HIV protease sequence that may have been a mutant of the base sequence. Thus, the vectors
are normalized by the length of 210, this length being the non-repeating information of 20x20
adjacency matrix of the 20 types of Aamino Acids in HIV protease. Thus, the complexity
of the vector generation is linear, and the vector generation could be executed on a single,
non-expensive computer.
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As a bi-product of being the neighborhood of a Delaunay triangulation, these vector
representations of HIV protese are also sparse. These sparse and normalized vectors could
use the shallow learning methods such as linear SVM with high effectiveness of average 99.5%
accuracy by the virtue of sparsity. These shallow classifiers could be generated and trained
on a single, non-expensive computer. Thus, the process of generating the feature-engineered
vectors and training a shallow classifier is highly cost effective.
The answer to the question of ”how does the resistance of HIV protease change with
evolution” could be found by using the same vector representations of HIV protease by
viewing the evolution as a graph across the time. The nodes of this graph are the vector
representations of the HIV protease and edges are the distances between these vectors. The
underlying assumption about this graph representing the evolution of HIV protease across
the time is that the further a representation is from that of the base sequence, the further it
mutated from the base and hence the further in time it is generated. To put these protease
nodes in a feasible evolution time frame, a minimal spanning tree of this graph was generated.
The root of the tree is perceived to be the base sequence of the HIV protease. The minimal
spanning tree represents the shortest paths from root to leaves. In the case of the HIV
protease, the minimal spanning tree thus represented a possible evolution mechanism from
the base sequence to be taken as start of the evolution and each edge representing the next
mutation. The study of the branches of this tree thus could yield the understanding of the
evolution of the HIV protease with respect to the resistance. By studying the branches of
this tree from roots to leaves, we found that the branches that converted to resistance early
on in the evolution, not only remained resistant, but the resistance level increased with the
time. We found a few branches that stayed non-resistant through the time, but the number
of these branches was much lower. The branches that converted to being resistant later on
could not preserve its resistance or were not highly resistant with the time.
This tendency of HIV to conserve resistance could be explained by HIV’s high rate of
mutation and basic principle of evolution: Highly resistant HIV’s mutations are also likely
to be resistant, and hence HIV reacts to the proteasae inhibitors through selective pressure
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of being resistant.

4.2

Concluding the language and ownership of messages in telegram’s illicit
and licit groups
Similar to the HIV protease dataset, the section 3 shows the results in two main aspects:

The goodness of the feature-engineered IBOW vectors in terms of sparsity, computational
complexity, and classification accuracy, and the new information gain obtained by using this
feature-engineered vectors.
In the setup of this research, we are given two sets of messages pertaining to two different entities and the question we ask is that given a new message, which set does it belong
to. As discussed in the section 3, the current approaches maximize the apriory information
by considering a union of the words in both given sets of messages. In contrast to these
approaches, IBOW is generated by taking only 20% of the intersecting words of both the
sets. IBOW vectors thus result in shorter and sparser vectors with respect to its comparable
statistical and deep-learning counterparts. IBOW vector generation could be classified algorithmically as local search in contrast to global optimization approach of the other methods.
IBOW identifies the words that are common in both sets but are used in different context
and hence have highly imbalanced frequency. This is done by calculating relative Kullback
measure of all the intersecting words. Hence the computational complexity of IBOW vector generation is quadratic in the number of intersecting words, which is achievable on a
non-expensive compute node locally.
The primary objective of IBOW vectors is to represent the given messages that could
be used to classify the authorship of the messages. IBOW vectors serve this purpose ideally because they sparcifies the text data while preserving the features that distinguish the
ownership of the message. In addition, by the virtue of their sparsity, IBOW vectors can
be used to train shallow learning models such as logistic regression, adaboost and artificial
neural networks. Again, this shallow learning could be computed on a single, non-expensive
compute node. These shallow learning classifiers trained on IBOW vectors result in the good-
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ness scores that are comparable to computationally expensive and complex statistical and
deep learning methods. Once trained, this classifiers could be used on smaller computers,
including field deployable devices that are not much more powerful than a cell phone.
The information gain by using IBOW vectors is the grammar free understanding of the
language that is used in the criminal domain the models were trained on. In particular,
IBOW vectors theme-selves represent the list of words that are idiomatic features and hence
are used in distinct contexts in the criminal lingo and vernacular English. Thus, this study
not only results in powerful classifiers automating the criminal message recognition process,
but also lead us to build a language prototype used as ”English” in the criminal domain.
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